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With a steady stream of reports about new cyber attacks and the vulner-abilities they exploit, it is 
easy to conclude that the overall state of 
cybersecurity is a mess. The developers 
of other engineered systems—such as 
bridges—seem to have evolved meth-
ods of design that keep their products 
safe and reliable. Why hasn’t this rela-
tive stability happened for networked 
computers? By examining a series of 
threats faced by computer systems 
engineers, and comparing them with 
those confronting bridge engineers, we 
can show significant differences that 
help explain why cybersecurity is more 
complex. But there are signs of hope for 
much better cybersecurity.
Severity of the Problem
Cyber insecurity has become a grow-
ing public concern and top priority with 
governments. Recent headline-grabbers 
include the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management data breach that com-
promised the confidential records of 22 
million federal employees, the Anthem 
health insurance system breach that ex-
posed personal data of 79 million people, 
the Target Corporation heist that harvest-
ed credit and debit card information of 
40 million people, and the attack on Sony 
Pictures Entertainment that destroyed 
data and startup software on more than 
3,000 computers, as well as disclosed pre-
release films and embarrassing emails of 
executives. Public officials openly worry 
about cyber attacks on critical infrastruc-
tures such as power, water, communica-
tions, and transportation. Their concerns 
are well-founded. In December 2015, for 
instance, a cyber attack against Ukrai-
nian power plants shut down electricity 
to 80,000 customers. Researchers have 
demonstrated numerous vulnerabilities 
in automobiles, airplanes, and medi-
cal devices that could be exploited with 
deadly consequences.
Reliable data on the extent and 
trends of cyber security incidents are 
surprisingly scarce. Security companies 
issue regular reports, but their findings 
are generally limited to data collected 
by surveys or through direct monitor-
ing of their customers, and the reports 
seldom show trends beyond the fiscal 
quarter or year. David Shephard of soft-
ware company NetIQ has extracted a 
list of 84 “most scary” facts and trends 
from multiple sources. Topping his list 
is a survey finding that 71 percent of 
organizations were victims of success-
ful cyber attacks in 2014. His statistics 
show increases in detected cyber inci-
dents, including a 517-percent increase 
for power and utility companies from 
2013 to 2014. The average cost per inci-
dent for corporations was $3.5 million 
in 2013. The U.S. Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team has also seen a rise in 
cyber incidents reported to them, grow-
ing more than tenfold from about 5,500 
in 2006 to more than 67,000 in 2014. The 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies and McAfee put the annual 
cost of global cybercrime in the range 
of $375 billion to $575 billion.
The U.S. government maintains a na-
tional database of all reported software 
flaws that could be exploited in cyber 
attacks; it shows a steady increase from 
1997 until about 2006, with a general 
leveling off at around 4,000 to 7,500 vul-
nerabilities per year after that. Although 
the leveling off sounds like good news, 
keep in mind that a single vulnerability 
can affect hundreds of millions of users. 
The majority of these vulnerabilities re-
side in top operating systems and appli-
cations software, including those from 
Apple (1,147 vulnerabilities in 2015), 
Microsoft (1,561), and Adobe (1,504). 
Considering that the desktop market 
share for Microsoft Windows and Ap-
ple Macintosh operating systems alone 
is greater than 95 percent, practically 
every desktop system is exposed. 
This sorry state is not due to a lack of 
concern about cybersecurity. Computer 
and information security has been an 
ongoing worry of system designers and 
operators since the 1960s. By 1965, in-
formation protection was taken as one 
of six fundamental concerns of operat-
ing systems and has remained so for 
50 years. These security technologies 
reflect a handful of basic themes: iso-
lation, access control, encryption, au-
thentication, and monitoring. But many 
cyber attacks are directed against the 
security technologies themselves—for 
example, guessing passwords or ex-
ploiting weaknesses in encryption pro-
tocols and antivirus software.
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Computer Systems and Bridges
Are other forms of infrastructure, such as 
bridges, as vulnerable to attack as cyber 
systems? Their physicality might make 
them seem easier to damage. But Wiki-
pedia lists fewer than 100 bridge failures 
worldwide since 2000, and the American 
Society of Civil Engineers reports that 11 
percent of 607,000 bridges in the United 
States contain deficiencies (known vul-
nerabilities determined by inspections). 
Both of these figures, either in absolute 
or relative terms, are dramatically lower 
than those for cyber incidents and vul-
nerabilities. Our bridges are in far better 
shape than our computers.
Computer systems and bridges have 
aspects in common. Both are engineered 
structures built from physical compo-
nents. Their engineers work from speci-
fications that give performance targets 
for critical functions. Both are concerned 
with moving traffic economically and 
efficiently—one with bits, the other with 
vehicles. Both are concerned with reli-
ability, dependability, safety, and secu-
rity. Both are susceptible, to varying de-
grees, to component and power failures, 
and external environmental factors such 
as earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, hur-
ricanes, wind, aging, and traffic loads. 
Both deal with threats, although their 
nature differs. Looking at some main ar-
eas of threats to cyber versus bridge se-
curity reveals reasons why cybersecurity 
is hard and such a pervasive problem.
Restricted Access
Most bridges are open to the public. Al-
though some require drivers pay a toll, 
they do not exclude most traffic. By 
contrast, most cyber systems are closed 
to the public, for the obvious reason 
that they are used to store and process 
sensitive information such as personal 
communications, financial data, health 
records, and trade secrets tied to indi-
viduals and organizations. To ensure 
that only authorized users have access, 
they require that users go through a 
login process that involves some means 
of authentication such as a password. 
All computer systems, whether open to 
public access (such as those in libraries) 
or closed, need to restrict what their 
users can do, so that they do not inad-
vertently or intentionally destroy sys-
tem files, plant malicious code on the 
machines, or otherwise interfere with 
normal operations and other users.
To enforce these restrictions, com-
puter systems employ a complex array 
of access controls that include not only 
login mechanisms, but also isolation 
techniques enforced by the operating 
system and hardware. These controls 
must ensure that users are only allowed 
to access digital objects such as files and 
database records for which they are 
authorized, and that they are only al-
lowed to perform operations and trans-
actions for which they have permission. 
Implementing these controls is vastly 
more complex than installing tollbooths 
and barbed wire on bridges. 
Although the access controls of op-
erating systems go a long way toward 
securing data within a computer, they 
do nothing to protect data in transit over 
networks. Indeed, most network traffic 
is vulnerable to eavesdropping and cor-
ruption. Protecting these data requires 
a completely different set of security 
controls—notably cryptographic meth-
ods for encrypting and authenticating 
data—and traffic monitors watching for 
suspicious activity. Network security 
brings up the knotty problem of surveil-
lance—less of a concern in a public loca-
tion such as a bridge, where anyone is 
able to observe the flow of traffic. 
Preventing Attacks
Except during times of war, bridges 
are rarely openly attacked. They may 
be vandalized with graffiti or blocked 
by protestors, but even these incidents 
are infrequent in comparison with the 
constant barrage of attacks against cy-
ber systems, which must be monitored 
every second of every day with tools 
such as firewalls and programs for the 
detection of intrusion and malware 
(malicious software).
There are several reasons why cyber-
space is a more attractive target of at-
tack than bridges, but by far the most 
important is that cyber systems hold 
data of value. Intruders steal credit and 
debit card data, as in the Target breach. 
They raid bank accounts. They steal 
trade secrets and other data they can 
sell or use for competitive advantage. 
They download and disclose data to 
embarrass their victims. And they ex-
tort money from their victims by hold-
ing their data hostage or by threatening 
to disclose sensitive data acquired in a 
security breach. Even data you think 
has no value to anyone but yourself can 
be monetized with ransomware, which 
encrypts all your data and demands that 
you pay a hefty fee for the unlocking 
key. Nation-states commonly compro-
mise the systems of adversaries and al-






















The vastness of the Internet has inspired artistic visualizations of its nodes and connections. 
These images (from left to right) were built from data in 2003, 2010, and 2015.  The striking in-
crease in visual complexity reflects the growth of the Internet over those dozen years. In 2003 
there were 40 million websites, and in 2015, 1 billion. Any one of those sites could send you mal-
ware. How can you defend against an attack that could come from any of a billion directions?
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China has been implicated in numerous 
breaches. North Korea objected to a mov-
ie depicting an assassination plot against 
its leader, and a group with ties to that 
country was blamed for the Sony attack. 
In addition, cyber attacks are rela-
tively cheap, easy to conduct, and of 
low risk to their perpetrators. Hacker 
tool kits are simple to acquire on the 
Internet. Young hackers have long 
been attracted to the thrill of invading 
someone else’s system, whereas activ-
ist groups such as Anonymous have 
found cyber attacks to be a convenient 
means of protest. For criminals, cyber-
crime is a lower-risk alternative to tra-
ditional heists, such as bank robberies.
User Error
Cyber systems are much more prone to 
the weaknesses of their human users 
than are bridges, where careless drivers 
are unlikely to do more harm than tie 
up traffic or damage a guardrail.
Ignorant and careless users pose on-
going risks to cybersecurity. They pick 
weak passwords, open attachments 
with malicious software, click on links 
that lead to malicious sites, lose their 
laptops and other portable devices, 
and fall for phishing scams that har-
vest their usernames and passwords. 
Even careful users can be victimized 
by a “drive-by download” attack if 
they visit a legitimate site that has 
been compromised and are injected 
with malware that automatically in-
fects their computer. 
In addition to users, system admin-
istrators can be a source of vulnerabili-
ties—for example, by failing to configure 
their systems for security, install patches, 
remove obsolete accounts, or respond 
to security alarms. Administrators need 
to install patches quickly for newly dis-
covered vulnerabilities, but a speedy re-
sponse does not always happen. Kenna 
Securities found that it takes companies 
on average 100 to 120 days to install 
patches, even though the probability of 
a vulnerability being exploited reaches 
90 percent within 60 days. 
Part of the reason that users fall 
short is that security is often incon-
venient, interfering with their ability 
to accomplish their goals. Users do 
not like using 15-character passwords 
such as “7t$xKQ34(2@ad9#” or install-
ing updates when they are busy with 
other things. They have difficulty us-
ing encryption and recognizing emails 
with malicious attachments and links. 
Some do not perceive the dangers and 
will bypass security protections and 
rules in their workplaces in order to 
get their jobs done more quickly.
Code Complexity
Cyber systems are enormously com-
plex. The two major desktop operat-
ing systems, Windows 10 and Mac 
OS 10.4, use 50 million and 86 million 
lines of code, respectively. No bridge 
has so many components. 
Each line of code in an operating 
system potentially contains errors that 
could be exploited to compromise se-
curity. Finding and removing vulner-
abilities in 50 million lines of operating- 
system code is devilishly hard for de-
velopers, which is why thousands of 
new errors are revealed each year. Add 
in software applications—including 
browsers, email, database systems, and 
document processing tools—and the 
problem quickly becomes intractable. 
Further, even if software products are 
shipped with no known security flaws, 
backdoors and malicious code can be 
inserted somewhere along the supply 
chain. Rogue retailers, for example, 
have been reported to install data- 
collecting malware on Android phones 
made and largely sold in China.
 To make matters worse, cyber sys-
tems are dynamic and constantly evolve. 
Whereas the American Society of Civil 
Engineers reports the average lifetime of 
bridges to be 42 years, software systems 
have much shorter lifetimes, measured 
in years rather than decades. Software 
systems are constantly upgraded—and 
the new and revised components often 
have novel vulnerabilities. In contrast, 
bridges are stable over their lifetimes, 
seldom require replacement parts, and 
need only periodic physical mainte-
nance such as painting and inspections.
On top of all this, there are theo-
retical limits to cybersecurity. In the 
1980s, security pioneer and computer 
scientist Frederick B. Cohen proved 
that it was impossible to develop an 
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possible computer viruses. We are un-
aware of any theoretical limitations to 
constructing safe bridges.
Connectivity
Almost by definition, cyber systems 
are joined up with one another. At-
tacks can come from any direction and 
their sources can be made untraceable. 
Bridges are not so immediately inter-
connected; an attack or failure on one 
cannot spread to another. 
Viruses and worms were some of the 
first lines of automated attacks enabled 
by network connectivity in the 1980s. 
The infamous Morris Worm of 1988 took 
down 10 percent of the Internet at the 
time in a few hours and stimulated the 
formation of the Computer Emergency 
Response Team at Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity. Malware has become so ubiqui-
tous that antivirus software has become 
a major industry. The Anti-Phishing 
Working Group reported that in the first 
quarter of 2015, the global malware in-
fection rate was 36 percent. Norway had 
the lowest rate at 20 percent, and China 
the highest at 48 percent.
Attacks on bridges require some 
sort of physical presence such as a 
bomb, an aerial attack, or a mass pro-
test. In contrast, remote attacks are 
common in cyberspace. The address 
from which you were directly attacked 
is probably not that of the perpetrator, 
because most attackers relay through 
multiple hosts to confound attribution.
Connectivity has also enabled attack-
ers to assemble large networks of com-
promised computers, called botnets, and 
use them to conduct attacks and send 
out spam. They are particularly popu-
lar for conducting distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks, which flood the 
chosen target with traffic and thus shut 
it down. Peak floods have reached hun-
dreds of gigabits per second of traffic, 
causing major disruptions. In late 2012 
and early 2013, an Iranian group shut 
off access to several bank sites with 
DDoS attacks reaching 120 gigabits per 
second, as a means of protest.
One of the biggest security con-
cerns is the emergence of the Internet 
of Things, which has been enabled by 
cheap wireless technology. Another fac-
tor has been a change in the standard 
for Internet addresses to increase the 
number of digits from 32 to 128, which 
has expanded available addresses from 
about 4.3 billion to a basically unlimited 
number—more than 3.4 x 1038. Now 
virtually every device and appliance 
can be connected to the Internet. The 
burgeoning Internet of Things is widely 
regarded as a potential security disaster 
because designers of individual things 
often pare down their operating sys-
tem to bare essentials, such as wireless 
connections, and do not preserve secu-
rity technologies. These devices con-
tain many more vulnerabilities than do 
commercial operating systems.
Cyber systems are now an essen-
tial component of every infrastructure 
and are embedded in industrial con-
trols systems. They are used to operate 
power grids, manage transportation 
systems, handle finances, move oil and 
gas, treat and distribute water, oper-
ate dams, and much more. Thus, an 
attack on a cyber system can have con-
sequences that go well beyond com-
puters and the data that they store, 
and can be a means of damaging many 
physical systems. Public officials and 
security professionals are increasing-
ly concerned that devastating cyber 
attacks against critical infrastructure 
could lead to loss of life and have a 
huge economic impact.
Market Forces
Absolved by licensing agreements, cy-
ber software vendors are generally not 
legally liable for flaws in their products. 
We are forced to accept their products 
“as is.” Bridge builders, by contrast, are 
subject to legal action in the event of 
failures owing to faulty construction. 
In addition, software companies are 
under tremendous pressure to get their 
products to market. If they spend too 
much time in development, they will 
lose market share when other compa-
nies beat them to the consumer. One 
consequence is that vendors limit the 
amount of time they spend hunting for 
and fixing vulnerabilities. A survey by 
the security software company Prevo-
ty found that 79 percent of companies 
release applications with known bugs; 
nearly half reported releasing apps 
with known vulnerabilities at least 80 
percent of the time. More than 70 per-
cent said that business pressures often 
overrode security concerns, whereas 
85 percent said that vulnerability re-
mediation significantly affected their 
ability to release software on schedule.
On the other hand, companies 
whose computer systems are attacked 
are more often being held liable for the 
harm it causes their customers. To set-
tle a class-action lawsuit following its 
security breach, Target set up a fund of 
$10 million for customers whose card 
payment data were compromised. 
Is There Hope?
Although the state of cybersecurity 
seems bleak, not all of the news is bad. 
Software developers now take security 
much more seriously than they did at 
the turn of the century. They heed their 
customers’ calls for more security for the 
personal data entrusted to them, and 
they cringe at lawsuits that will surely 
follow a damaging attack. Microsoft, for 
example, uses Security Development 
Lifecycle (SDL), a software development 
management process they created to en-
force secure coding practices. Adopting 
SDL has significantly reduced the num-
ber of vulnerabilities in their software. 
The software industry’s greater emphasis 
on security is no doubt one reason that 
the number of reported vulnerabilities 
has flattened out in recent years. Even so, 
many see security not as the top priority 
but as a tradeoff with other objectives, 
such as functionality and performance.
The cyber security community has 
also responded to the growing threat 
with new technologies and guidelines 
for operating cyber systems securely. 
Although no single security technol-
ogy can make a system secure, using 
them together with recognized secu-
rity practices provides many impedi-
ments to intruders and malware. The 
federal government and industry have 
developed a list of 20 critical securi-
ty controls, and if everyone adopted 
these protocols, we would see a dra-
matic drop in successful cyber attacks.
Moreover, with help from industry, 
governments are taking greater steps 
to go after those responsible for cyber 
attacks and to shut down botnets and 
sites used to distribute malware and 
support cyber attacks. Governments 
and industry are sharing more threat 
intelligence so that organizations can 
better protect their systems. 
Although cyber attacks certainly have 
been on the rise, so too has the use of 
cyber systems. An interesting study by 
Eric Jardine of the Centre for Interna-
tional Governance Innovation in Cana-
da finds that relative to the growth of the 
Internet, many measures of insecurity 
growth show it slowing down or even 
declining. Such results are encouraging; 
at the least, they suggest that the threat is 
not getting too far ahead of us.
(A reference list for this article is available at 
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